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Explaining Anglo-German
productivity differences in services
since 
STEPHEN BROA DBERRY ∗
Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV AL,
United Kingdom
Germany overtook Britain in comparative productivity levels for the whole
economy primarily as a result of trends in services rather than trends in
industry. Britain’s productivity lead in services before World War II
reflected external economies of scale in a highly urbanised economy with
an international orientation. Low productivity in Germany reflected the
underdevelopment of services in an economy that was slow to move out of
agriculture. As German agricultural employment contracted sharply from
the s, catching-up occurred in services. This was aided by a sharp
increase in human and physical capital accumulation, underpinned by the
institutional framework of the postwar settlement.
. Introduction
Germany overtook Britain in comparative productivity levels for the whole
economy primarily as a result of trends in services rather than trends in
industry (Broadberry c, ). Before World War II, although labour
productivity in German industry was on a par with British industry, German
labour productivity in services was substantially lower than in British
services. Furthermore, services have accounted for a much smaller share
of employment in Germany throughout the period since , largely as
a result of a larger agricultural sector before World War II, and a larger
industrial sector since. And yet, most studies of comparative productivity
performance continue to focus on industry and to ignore services.
This article provides an overview of Anglo-German comparative
productivity performance in services since , building on Broadberry
and Ghosal’s () Anglo-American study. Although Britain began to
fall behind the United States in parts of the service sector from the late
nineteenth century as a result of the adoption of high volume methods
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using modern office technology, British productivity in most parts of the
service sector remained higher than in Germany until after World War II
(Broadberry and Ghosal , Broadberry ). In sectors where
Germany was able to adopt US methods (particularly in transport and
communications), productivity was relatively high, but large parts of the
German service sector remained too spread out in a predominantly rural
society with a large agricultural sector. Britain’s high level of urbanisation,
together with an international orientation in much of the commercial service
sector, generated external economies of scale which underpinned high levels
of productivity.
German catching-up in most parts of the service sector occurred only
after World War II, with the shrinking of the agricultural sector. The shift
of labour from agriculture into services was accompanied by high levels of
physical and human capital accumulation in Germany, associated with the
institutional framework of the postwar settlement (Carlin , Eichengreen
). This underpinned the spread of vocational training from industry into
services after World War II, coupled with high rates of investment in physical
capital. As a result, Germany has achieved higher levels of productivity than
Britain in most parts of the service sector since the s.
. Comparative productivity levels in services, –
.. Services and the aggregate economy
The basic approach to establishing Anglo-German comparative labour
productivity levels for the period – is to assemble time series of
output and employment for Britain and Germany and to project the implied
trend in comparative labour productivity both forwards and backwards from
a  benchmark (Broadberry c). The  benchmark was established
on a sectoral basis, using either physical indicators of output per employee
or value added per worker converted to a common currency using unit
value ratios, and the reader is referred to Broadberry (c, pp. –) and
Broadberry and Fremdling () for further details. For the time series,
conventional national accounts sources for the post-World War II period
have been supplemented with historical national accounts data taken from
Feinstein () for Britain and from Hoffmann () for Germany for the
pre-World War II period. After setting out the basic trends, we will consider
the implications of some recent challenges to the Hoffmann data.
The importance of services to the German overtaking of Britain can be
demonstrated with Tables  and . The concept of labour productivity used
here is output per person engaged, since hours worked are not available on a
consistent sectoral basis before World War II. As noted above, the estimates
are based on time series projections from a benchmark for , although
they have also been checked against additional benchmarks for a number of
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Table . Comparative Germany/UK labour productivity levels by sector,
– (UK = ).
Agriculture Industry Services Aggregate economy
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
Notes: Benchmark estimates of comparative productivity levels for  are projected to
other years using time series for output and employment from historical national accounting
sources.
Sources: Derived from Broadberry (c).
later years. Although Broadberry () presented figures for comparative
productivity levels in ten sectors, it is helpful to begin the analysis here
with a three-sector breakdown between agriculture, industry and services.
Industry includes mineral extraction, manufacturing, construction and the
utilities, while services includes transport and communications, distribution
and finance, professional and personal services, and government. Agriculture
includes forestry and fishing as well as agriculture more narrowly defined.
In Table , we see that aggregate labour productivity in Germany was
about per cent of the British level in , rising to about three-quarters
of the British level by . After a setback across World War I, aggregate
labour productivity in Germany regained three-quarters of the British level
by the mid-s, but there was another German setback across World
War II. There was rapid labour productivity growth in the Federal German
Republic during the s and s, but German overtaking of Britain
occurred only during the mid-s. Germany then forged ahead until ,
and during the s comparative aggregate labour productivity fluctuated
without trend until reunification.
Turning to the sectoral estimates, note first that the long-run trends
in comparative labour productivity levels for the aggregate economy owe
rather less to trends in industry than is usually assumed in accounts of
comparative productivity performance. Thus, for example, between 
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Table . Sectoral shares of employment in the United Kingdom and
Germany, – (%).
Agriculture Industry Services
A. United Kingdom
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
B. Germany
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
Sources: United Kingdom: derived from Feinstein (); CSO, Annual Abstract of Statistics
and OECD, Labour Force Statistics. Germany: derived from Hoffmann () and
Statistisches Bundesamt, Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen.
and  the German labour productivity lead in industry declined while
for the aggregate economy Germany went from three-quarters of the British
level to a lead of more than per cent. Note, second, that comparative
productivity trends in services broadly mirror comparative productivity
trends for the economy as a whole. And note, third, from Table , that
the shift out of agricultural employment occurred much later in Germany
than in Britain. As many writers have recognised, this is important for overall
productivity performance because agriculture is a low value-added activity
(Kaldor , Kindleberger , Temin ). However, we shall also
argue that the late movement out of agriculture further penalised Germany’s
overall productivity performance because of the under-development of the
service sector.
 Over shorter periods, however, there have been substantial movements in comparative
Germany/UK productivity levels in industry. Broadberry (a) emphasises the German
forging ahead in manufacturing during the s, with Germany attaining close to a per
cent productivity lead by the end of the decade. This was not sustained, however, and by
the end of the s, most of the German lead had been eliminated. See also Broadberry
and Crafts ().
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Table . Comparative Germany/UK labour productivity levels in market
services, – (UK = ).
Transport/ Distribution/ Professional/
communications finance personal services
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
Notes: Benchmark estimates of comparative productivity levels for  are projected to
other years using time series for output and employment from historical national accounting
sources.
Source: Derived from Broadberry (c).
.. Market services
Although productivity in non-market services is difficult to interpret
because of problems in measuring output independently of inputs, these
difficulties are much less severe in market services such as transport and
communications, distribution and finance. The United Kingdom Central
Statistical Office (, pp. –) lists the primary indicators used in
tracking real output in the British national accounts, which runs to seven
pages on market services. Many of these indicators are available on a
comparative basis, and have been used to derive the estimates of comparative
Germany/ UK labour productivity levels by sector in Table .
Broadberry (a) shows that there was a wide spread of comparative
Anglo-German productivity levels across different industries within manu-
facturing. Similarly, there was a spread of comparative productivity levels
within market services, as can be seen here in Table . For selected
benchmark years, it is also possible to obtain estimates of comparative labour
productivity levels at a more disaggregated level, and these are presented
in Table . The cross-sectional variation in comparative productivity levels,
together with the time-series variation within each sector, helps to identify the
key factors explaining comparative productivity performance.
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Table . Benchmark estimates of comparative Germany/UK labour
productivity levels in market services, – (UK = ).
   
Railways . . .
Road transport .
Shipping .
Air transport .
Communications . . .
Distribution }
. . .
Finance .
Notes: Benchmark estimates based on direct observation for the years stated.
Sources: Broadberry (c). Additional figures for  from Pryke (), for  from
Smith et al. (), for  from O’Mahony et al. ().
We see in Table  that Germany had already overtaken Britain before World
War I in transport and communications. However, the scale of the German
lead in this sector at this time owed much to the relative importance of
the railways and was subsequently reduced as other forms of transport and
communications accounted for a growing share of economic activity. In
distribution and finance, German productivity levels remained a long way
behind British productivity levels before World War II. This part of the
service sector remained relatively underdeveloped in Germany at this time,
and German overtaking occurred only during the s.
Finally in this section, it is worth noting some differences in the structure
of the service sector in the two countries, drawing on Table . First, transport
and communications accounted for a much smaller share of employment in
Germany than in Britain until the s. Although Germany constructed
a productive railway system in the nineteenth century and built up an
efficient liner fleet on the North Atlantic route before World War I, the
rest of the German transport and communications sector was relatively
small and unproductive. For the entire period, distribution and finance have
accounted for a smaller share of employment in Germany than in Britain.
Other services have also remained substantially smaller in Germany, which
has had a correspondingly large agricultural sector before the s, and a
large industrial sector since the s.
 The scale of the German lead in transport and communications before World War I is
lower here than suggested in Broadberry (c), due to a correction for prewar
employment on the German railways. Hoffmann (, pp. , ) allocated all
technical personnel to industry before World War I, and a correction can be made for this
using the later proportional breakdown between industry and the railways.
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Table . Sectoral shares of employment in selected services (% of total
employment).
Transport/ Distribution/ Professional/
communications finance personal services
A. United Kingdom
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
B. Germany
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
Sources: United Kingdom: derived from Feinstein (); OECD, Labour Force Statistics;
and CSO, Annual Abstract of Statistics. Germany: derived from Hoffmann () and
Statistisches Bundesamt, Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen.
.. The implications of alternative German data series
The above estimates rely largely on Hoffmann () for German time series
of output and employment. We now consider briefly the implications of some
alternative German data sources, particularly for output. Ritschl (a,
b) argues that Hoffmann’s () series for real output are flawed,
particularly for industry and agriculture. It is interesting to note, however,
that his use of alternative output series from Wagenfu¨hr () and von der
Decken and Wagenfu¨hr () does not lead to a major change in the path
of aggregate output. Rather, it leads to offsetting changes in the paths of
agricultural and industrial production. The key finding of Ritschl (a)
is that Wagenfu¨hr’s () index of industrial production grew more slowly
than Hoffmann’s () index before World War II, while Ritschl (b)
argues that von der Decken and Wagenfu¨hr’s () measure of agricultural
output grew more rapidly than Hoffmann’s. Hence, projecting backwards
from , Ritschl (b) finds for the pre-World War I period a larger
German labour productivity lead in industry and an even more backward
German agricultural sector. This has the effect, then, of confirming the
basic sectoral patterns of Anglo-German comparative labour productivity
 European Review of Economic History
levels established by Broadberry (c), but in a more exaggerated
fashion.
Hence, for example, whereas Broadberry (c, p. ) reports a figure
of . for the comparative Germany/UK labour productivity level in
agriculture in , Ritschl (b) reports a value of .. Offsetting this,
however, in manufacturing, whereas Broadberry (c, p. ) reports a
comparative Germany/UK labour productivity level of ., Ritschl (b)
finds a value of .. The problem with this is that the exaggerated German
labour productivity lead in manufacturing during the pre-World War I period
would be very hard to square with what is known about nominal incomes in
industry. For example, Fremdling () found industrial value added per
employee in Germany to be lower than in Britain just before World War I
when converted to a common currency using a purchasing power parity
adjusted price ratio. It is likely that Hoffmann’s () estimates of capital
income, used by Fremdling (), are too low. However, whereas it is
possible to see how this could be consistent with a small German labour
productivity advantage in manufacturing before World War I, it is difficult
to see how it could possibly be consistent with a German productivity lead
of the order of magnitude suggested by Ritschl (b). Note further, that
this work has no implications for comparative productivity in services, which
is the focus of attention in this article.
. Key aspects of Britain’s productivity performance
in services
.. External economies of scale in Britain
Britain was highly successful in commercial services during the nineteenth
century, playing a key international role in shipping, distribution and finance.
For most of the nineteenth century, Britain had a labour productivity lead
over the United States as well as over Germany in services as a whole
(Broadberry b, ; Broadberry and Irwin, ). Similarly, British
success in commercial services shows up in the balance of payments, with
Imlah’s () figures on the net contribution of business services to the
current account surplus amounting to £. m in , or about per cent
of national income.
This British success was based on external rather than internal economies
of scale. The City of London provided the largest agglomeration of
commercial activity in the world, yet it consisted of a large number
of small firms rather than a small number of giant firms. The large
scale of the overall activity facilitated specialisation, and each firm could
 Indeed, Fremdling (, pp. –) himself suggests this.
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benefit from proximity to other specialised firms in classic Marshallian
fashion (Marshall ). Since asymmetric information was endemic in
this type of activity, it was important to be able to deter opportunistic
behaviour. As a result, trade often took place within networks of agents,
who could be trusted. Although there is a large historical literature on
merchant networks from medieval times, it is only recently that economic
historians and economists have begun to analyse the economic mechanisms
underpinning them. The pioneering work in this field by Greif () used
the geniza documents to show the importance of a reputation mechanism
in sustaining trade among Maghribi traders during the eleventh century.
Subsequent work, summarised in Greif (), puts this example of an
early merchant network into a general framework, where for individuals to
enter into mutually beneficial exchange relationships, they have to be able
to commit to fulfil their contractual obligations. The merchant network
can be seen, then, as one way of mitigating this ‘fundamental problem of
exchange’.
Britain’s commercial networks in the modern period can now be
understood in the light of this framework. In shipping, Boyce’s ()
detailed study of share purchases in ninety-nine steamship ventures
registered in West Hartlepool over the five-year period – captures
information asymmetries by distinguishing occupational categories of
shareholders, and captures the building up of reputation and trust over
time by examining patterns of repeat purchase. Other studies by Ville (,
) and Cottrell () document the role of networks in other ports,
including London, Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Liverpool. In finance, Cassis
() uses information on bankers and bank directors from ten private
banks,  merchant banks, seven discount houses,  joint stock banks, 
overseas (colonial) banks and the Bank of England to provide an equally
detailed study of networks in the City of London, but focusing on social
as well as economic aspects. He builds up a picture of small family firms,
public school and Oxbridge education, marriage into the aristocracy and
Empire links. But whereas this is sometimes used to suggest a culture of
industrial decline, it is seen here to be associated with commercial success.
In distribution, the study by Broadberry and Marrison () emphasises
the key role of merchants in the generation of external economies of scale in
the Lancashire cotton industry.
 In a principal-agent problem with imperfect monitoring, an agent may try to pass off a
business loss for the principal as due to bad luck when it is due to inadequate effort or
downright fraud. The agent may, for example, claim that a cargo was lost in rough weather
or stolen in port when it was lost due to the negligence of the agent in leaving it unattended
or even sold for the agent’s profit to an unscrupulous merchant.
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.. American developments
In , although Britain still had a labour productivity lead over the United
States in services as a whole, the United States had already caught up in
transport and communications (Broadberry and Ghosal ). By World
War I, furthermore, the United States had a substantial labour productivity
lead over Britain in this sector. In distribution, the United States had just
overtaken Britain by World War I, but Britain remained ahead in other
services until the interwar period. In services as a whole, therefore, the
United States was already ahead by World War I and continued to forge
ahead until the s. Britain only narrowed the productivity gap with the
United States in services (and the economy as a whole) substantially from
the s.
Broadberry and Ghosal () attribute this growing US superiority in
services during the first three-quarters of the twentieth century to the spread
of a standardised, high-volume, low-margin approach based on hierarchical
management and utilising technologies that improved communications and
information processing. These technologies were slower to diffuse in Britain
as a result of lower levels of education and strong labour force resistance
to the intensification of the labour process that their efficient use required.
This explanation is consistent with the observed pattern of comparative
US/UK labour productivity levels, since these high-volume methods diffused
rapidly in some sectors, but more slowly in others. These methods were
first developed on the railways, then spread quickly to other parts of the
transport and communications sector, including steamship lines, urban
traction systems and the telegraph and telephone systems (Chandler ,
pp. –). However, in distribution, there were limits to the degree of
centralisation and standardisation that consumers found acceptable, and
there were also restraints on competition which acted to support small retail
outlets (Hall et al. , pp. –; Field , p. ; McCraw ). In
banking and finance, there were obvious dangers in adopting a high-volume,
impersonal, standardised approach, since asymmetric information and trust
are very important in this sector, while regulations prevented the growth of
interstate banking (White , p. ).
Although this article focuses on transport and communications,
distribution and finance, Bakker’s () study of the entertainment sector is
suggestive of how the approach can also be applied to other personal services,
where output is often less well measured in the national accounts. His use of
the term ‘industrialisation of services’ captures broadly the same phenomena
as the shift to a standardised, high-volume, low-margin approach based on
hierarchical management that is emphasised here.
 A fuller treatment of the theoretical issues raised by the coexistence of high-volume and
low-volume methods, including a formal model, is available in Broadberry and Ghosal
().
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. German services before World War II in comparative
perspective
.. The effects of tariff protection
Tariff protection in late nineteenth century Germany was designed to slow
down the decline of agriculture and accelerate the development of heavy
industry. The alliance of ‘rye and iron’ in the newly formed German Reich
meant that proportionally, at least, services had to be the loser. This effective
bias against services strengthened considerably after World War I with the
growing scale of protection.
German agricultural tariffs can be seen as an attempt to stave off a ‘grain
invasion’ from the United States. On the eve of World War I, agriculture still
accounted for .per cent of employment in Germany, compared with just
.per cent in Britain (Table ). Even in the United States, a land-abundant
grain exporter, agriculture accounted for a smaller share of employment. One
effect of Britain’s policy of free trade in agriculture following the repeal of
the Corn Laws in , then, was undoubtedly a further transfer of labour
from agriculture into industry and services. The agriculture that remained in
Britain was highly productive, and able to compete internationally. This was
achieved partly by increasing capital intensity in what remained of arable
farming, and partly by shifting the product mix away from grain towards
higher-value-added pastoral products (Brown , pp. –, ; O´ Gra´da
, pp. –). The high levels of agricultural labour productivity that
already characterised British agriculture during the Industrial Revolution
were raised still further, and the relatively small British agricultural sector
continued to achieve labour productivity levels on a par with the United
States before World War I.
Webb () argues that industrial tariffs in Wilhelmine Germany, often in
combination with cartels, should be seen as an attempt to reduce the riskiness
of investment in capital intensive technologies by restricting competition. He
thus sees tariffs as successfully stimulating heavy industry in Germany. To
the extent that tariffs slowed down the shift of labour out of agriculture
and accelerated the expansion of industrial employment, then services must
have been squeezed. Nevertheless, the scale of the retreat from free trade
in Germany before World War I must be kept in proportion. The figures
in Table  suggest that customs revenue as a share of import values was
not dramatically higher in Germany than in Britain before World War I,
although the scale of the difference is increased if the British figures are
adjusted to allow for revenue-raising duties on tobacco and petrol, which
were not produced domestically. Compared with the retreat into autarky
during the s, however, Germany remained integrated into the world
economy before . Table  shows multilateral tariff rates on a number of
key commodities on the eve of World War I. They show Britain to be a free
trade country and Germany moderately protectionist. However, it should
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Table . Customs revenue as a share of import values in the United
Kingdom and Germany, – (%).
United Kingdom
Germany
Total Excl. tobacco & petrol Total
 . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 .
 .
 . . .
 . . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
Sources: United Kingdom: Total customs revenue from Mitchell (, pp. –); Total
import values from Mitchell (, pp. –); Customs revenue from tobacco and petrol
from CSO, Statistical Abstract of the United Kingdom, Annual Abstract of Statistics, and
National Income and Expenditure. Imports of tobacco and petrol from Mitchell (,
pp. –). Germany: Customs duties and imports from Mitchell () to , updated
from Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch fu¨r die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
be noted that Germany had a high tariff on wheat, the key agricultural
product.
The consequences of these protectionist policies for German productivity
performance have often been misunderstood. Contemporaries and historians
have consistently overestimated the strength of the German economy before
World War II by focusing on the modern sectors which policy was designed to
promote. However, it is important to remember that these Gerschenkronian
policies had adverse consequences for the less favoured sectors. The
underdevelopment of these other sectors shows up in low productivity,
but can also be seen in their low shares of economic activity. Olson (,
pp. –) highlights the importance of these factors for the outcome of
the two world wars, noting that it was Germany rather than Britain that
collapsed under the pressure of blockade. Olson (, pp. –) points to
the ability of the British agricultural sector to expand output on the stored-up
fertility of grasslands brought back into arable use, compared with the
inability of German agriculture to maintain output at full stretch in the
face of wartime disruption. However, Olson (, p. ) also argues that
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Table . Multilateral tariffs in , selected commodities (German marks per  kg).
Cotton Cotton fabric Cotton fabric Bar Sheet Sewing
Wheat yarn unbleached printed Laces iron iron needles
Russia free . ,. ,. ,. . . .
Spain . . . . ,. . . .
United States . . . . % . . %
Austria-Hungary . . – . . . . .
France . . . . . . . .
Italy . . . . . . . .
Germany . . . . . . . .
Sweden . . . . . free . .
Denmark free . . . . . . .
Belgium free . . . % . . %
Norway . . . . . free free .
Japan . . . . . . . .
Switzerland . . . . . . . .
Netherlands free free % % % % % %
Great Britain free free free free free free free free
Notes: Percentage values refer to ad valorem rates.
Source: Grunzel (, pp. –).
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the decisive factor was the flexibility of the British service sector, which was
able to draw on a wealth of experience in general administration as well as
skills directly related to distribution and finance.
.. The Gerschenkronian perspective reconsidered
The widespread overestimation of the performance of the German economy
before World War II is dependent on a view of economic activity which
privileges industry, and particularly heavy industry. In the widely accepted
Gerschenkronian analysis of Germany’s industrialisation, the success of
German heavy industry receives a great deal of attention (Tilly ).
However, there is much less acknowledgement of the costs arising from
the protection of agriculture in the face of competition from the New
World, and even less recognition of the underdevelopment of services in
Germany. Indeed, since the Gerschenkronian analysis emphasises the role of
the railways in creating a national market and the role of the universal banks
in mobilising finance for heavy industry, there is even a danger that economic
historians may draw the seriously misleading conclusion that Germany had
a dynamic and highly productive service sector. But in fact, although the
German railway system was relatively productive, the German banking
system was distinctly underdeveloped compared with its British counterpart
(Collins , p. ). Furthermore, productivity remained relatively low in
most of the German service sector, with its low level of specialisation.
The lack of specialisation in the German service sector can be linked to
the slow contraction of agriculture behind tariff barriers, combined with the
direction of resources into industry. With such a large share of the labour
force tied up in low productivity agriculture and receiving low incomes,
the extent of the domestic market for services was necessarily limited.
Furthermore, the German service sector was much less geared towards
overseas markets than the British service sector, which had developed a
global outlook with the expansion of the British empire during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries (Cain and Hopkins , Rubinstein ). With
specialisation limited by the extent of the market, the German tendencies
towards autarky and a large domestic agricultural sector before World War II
resulted in relatively low productivity in services, as well as in agriculture
(Stigler , Smolensky ).
.. Railways
The German railways have received a great deal of attention because of their
perceived role in creating a unified national market (Fremdling ). This
is traditionally seen as important for industrial development, and hence for
industrial productivity. From the perspective of this article, however, the
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most remarkable feature of the German railways is their role in generating
high levels of productivity in the transport and communications sector. The
key question is how did Germany manage to achieve such high levels of
productivity on the railways when productivity in the rest of the service
sector was so low? To understand this, it is helpful to return to the origins
of modern business enterprise in the United States during the nineteenth
century.
Modern business enterprise, characterised by standardised, high-volume,
low-margin business and multiple operating units managed by a hierarchy
of salaried executives, began on the US railroads during the late nineteenth
century (Chandler , pp. –). This hierarchical form of organisation
did not fit well with British social capabilities, and British productivity
performance lagged behind most strongly in sectors where this form of
organisation diffused most fully (Broadberry and Ghosal ). The railway
system that emerged in Germany was also organised on the basis of
modern business enterprise, with a high-volume, low-margin approach and
hierarchical management, since there was no room on the railways for niche
producers organised on a network basis, generating external economies
of scale. German social capabilities must in this respect be regarded as
closer to American than British capabilities. However, the promotion of
heavy industry, centred on iron and steel and coal, which needed to be
transported in bulk, was important in generating the internal economies
of scale that underpinned Germany’s high productivity on the railways
(Fremdling ). Note that the railways were, in turn, very important
users of these products, generating important backward linkages (Fremdling
). It must be emphasised, however, that the high productivity of the
railways was very atypical of German services.
.. Banks
The Gerschenkronian literature alleges that the German universal banks
mobilised capital for domestic industry, while the British clearing banks
failed to provide long-term support to British industry (Gerschenkron ,
pp. –; Kennedy , pp. –). There are a number of problems with
this view, however. First, it is clear that in Germany, as well as in Britain,
most industrial investment was financed from internal rather than external
funds (Edwards and Ogilvie , Fohlin ). Second, it is important to
 Social capabilities are obviously a macro concept. Nevertheless, certain social capabilities
are more useful for some sectors than for others. A society that is good at hierarchical
management is more likely to be successful in sectors where hierarchical management is
essential (such as the railways) than in sectors where personal contact within networks of
trust is important (such as international finance). The theoretical underpinnings of this
view are discussed in Broadberry and Ghosal ().
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recognise that the British clearing banks were part of a specialised system,
with merchant banks responsible for the mobilisation of long-term capital.
Third, even if defined widely to include the private banks as well as the
joint stock credit banks, the universal banks never accounted for more than
about half of the German credit market (Guinnane , p. ). The public
savings banks (Sparkassen), credit co-operatives, mortgage banks and other
small institutions that made up the banking sector were often oriented
more towards agriculture than industry. They pulled down the average
productivity performance of the German banking sector, with municipal
control often leading to the sacrifice of profits for social objectives and the
ambitions of local politicians. Fourth, in terms of short-term lending to
industry, on which it is fair to judge the British clearing banks, recent archival
research has revealed that they were just as supportive as their continental
counterparts (Capie and Collins , Baker and Collins ). But even
if the clearing banks supported British industry with short-term funds, it is
still possible that the merchant banks, with their primary responsibility for
long-term funds, were biased against British industry. But if that were the
case, it should show up in relative rates of return on domestic and overseas
issues. Edelstein (), however, has shown that rates of return on domestic
and overseas assets of the same risk (measured by the variance of returns)
were not significantly different.
In general, it seems almost perverse to criticise the highly specialised
British system in comparison with the German universal system, since even
in Gerschenkron’s () view, universal banking was seen as a result of
economic backwardness. Finance was provided on a much greater overall
scale in Britain than in Germany before World War I, permitting greater
specialisation and sophistication. It makes little sense, then, to criticise
English banks for failing to develop along German lines as if the German
system were the final stage on a development path (Collins , p. ).
This is important once we take the view that it is the overall level of GDP
rather than just industrial output that matters, since the British financial
system with its global outlook clearly generated high levels of GDP per
person employed. Furthermore, even if attention is limited to industrial
output, it is important to bear in mind that to the extent that German
banks were successful at directing funds into heavy industry, this meant that
light industry was starved of funds (Neuburger and Stokes , Tilly ).
This matters because any productivity advantage that Germany enjoyed over
Britain in heavy industry was offset by lower productivity in light industry
(Broadberry and Fremdling , Broadberry a).
Arguments concerning the alleged superiority of the German universal
banking system over the British specialised system rarely consider the
interwar period. And yet, it is precisely during such volatile times that the
disadvantages of banks tying up their assets in long-term loans to industry
become most obvious. Had Britain’s clearing banks become more heavily
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involved in industrial rationalisation as Best and Humphries (), Tolliday
() and others have urged, it is likely that the stability of the financial
system would have been threatened. As it was, the liquidity of the British
clearing banks helped Britain to avoid the devastating collapse of the banking
system that occurred in Germany, the United States and other countries, and
there were no important bank failures in Britain during the s (Collins
, pp. –). Indeed, the experience of the financial crisis after 
led the United States to insist on a clear separation between commercial and
investment banking in the Glass-Steagall Act of  (Carosso , p. ).
.. Other services
The rest of the German market service sector appears decidedly
underdeveloped in the pre-World War II period, and has attracted little
attention in the modern literature. The most important other sector to
consider is distribution, which Hoffmann () grouped together with
finance in a general trade or commerce sector (Handel). As with finance,
one contrast between Britain and Germany is the greater importance of
international business for the former, with British merchant wholesalers at
the hub of a global trading system. A recent study by Jones () documents
the growth of the British overseas trading companies and their continued
success during the pre-World War II period on the basis of the network form
of organisation.
However, the quantitatively most important part of the distribution sector
was domestic retailing, and here again there were important contrasts
between Britain and Germany. An important trend in Britain, as in the
United States, was the emergence of large-scale enterprise in retailing, in the
form of multiple shops (chain stores), department stores and Co-operative
Societies (Clapham , pp. –). Jefferys (, pp. –, –) shows
that the share of large-scale retailers in the total UK retail trade increased
from .per cent in  to .per cent by . Jefferys (, p. )
sees this development as dependent on the existence of a large, steady
and consistent demand from a relatively homogeneous urban working class.
This provides a strong contrast with Germany, which remained a far more
agricultural and rural society until well after World War II, serviced by a
large number of small general shops (Mataja , pp. –). Although the
United States was also more rural than Britain, most writers have stressed
the homogeneity of US demand, even among the rural population. Whereas
the mail-order store provided cheap homogeneous goods to rural consumers
in the United States, this occurred on a much more limited scale in Germany
 The organisational details can nevertheless be readily obtained from studies carried out by
the German historical school of economics (Conrad et al. , Aubin and Zorn ,
Henning ).
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(Chandler , pp. , ). It must also be remembered that per capita
incomes were always higher in the United States than in Germany.
When large-scale department stores, chain stores and consumer co-
operatives threatened for the first time to take significant market share
from Germany’s small-scale Mittelstand retailers in the interwar period, the
latter organised buyer co-operatives and pressed for legislation to limit the
growth of large retailers (Kopper , pp. –). Persuading the National
Socialists that department stores and chain stores were part of a Jewish
world conspiracy, the Mittelstand retailer-activists were successful in securing
legislation to tax large-scale retailers more heavily, to ban the founding or
expansion of such businesses, and to limit price discounts (Kopper ,
pp. –). However, a voluntary ‘Aryanisation’ of boards saved the
department stores from extinction (Homburg , pp. –). Many of
the restrictions on German retailing survived well into the post-World War
II period (Kopper , pp. –).
It is not simply that there were more large British firms in distribution
and other services, however. It is just as important that the overall size of
these service sector activities was greater in Britain, so that the many small
firms were able to benefit from external economies of scale. This followed
partly from the greater international orientation of the British economy, but
it also resulted simply from the smaller share of economic activity accounted
for by agriculture in Britain. In Germany, with such a large fraction of the
total labour force engaged in agriculture and such a large share of the non-
agricultural labour force engaged in industry, there was simply not the labour
available to provide services on the same level as in Britain. There is thus
a strong contrast between the small but specialised service sector firms in
Britain, reaping external economies of scale, and the small, general service
sector firms in Germany, operating at lower levels of productivity.
.. Large firms in British and German services
The above analysis has suggested that German services have to be treated
carefully in any international comparison, because of the way that the process
of modernisation occurred in Germany. Given the importance of the railways
in creating a unified market and the role of the universal banks in mobilising
 Indeed, the Rabattgesetz of , which limited discounts to per cent, lasted until 
(Kopper , p. ).
 Mataja (: ) finds little more than three-quarters of the businesses in Germany’s
Handel sector in  to be specialised in trade. Figures from the Statistisches Jahrbuch fu¨r
das Deutsche Reich for  show the average firm size in retailing in  to vary between 
and  persons in all branches apart from electrical goods and office supplies. In
wholesaling, average employment was less than  in all branches apart from electrical
goods and office supplies.
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Table . Largest  employers in the United Kingdom and Germany,
circa .
Large firm
Employees employment
in large as % of all Number
firms employment of firms
A. United Kingdom
Industry , . 
Services:
Transport & Communications , . 
Distribution , . 
Finance , . 
Total services , . 
Total economy ,, . 
B. Germany (largest  employers)
Industry ,, . 
Services:
Transport & Communications , . 
Distribution  }
.

Finance , 
Total services ,, . 
Total economy ,, . 
Note: Gas, electricity and water are included in industry; German employment figures are
available only for distribution and finance together; German employment data in transport
and communications includes an allowance for technical personnel.
Source: Derived from Wardley (). Employment by sector from Feinstein () and
Hoffmann ().
capital for heavy industry, we should expect to see the early emergence of
a number of large firms in these sectors, achieving relatively high labour
productivity. In the rest of the service sector, however, we should expect
to see relatively few large firms. The data on the  largest employers in
Britain and Germany around the year  in Table  allow us to compare
the scale of employment in large firms with a breakdown between industry
and services, and between the main service sectors.
Of the  largest employers in the two countries, just  were in services in
Germany, compared with  in Britain. In absolute terms, the distribution of
firm size was quite similar in the two countries, although a few German firms
at the top end of the distribution were larger than their British counterparts,
while the British firms at the lower end of the distribution were a little
larger than their German counterparts (Wardley ). Because these giant
 That is not to say that large scale is always good, since it can lead to the abuse of
monopoly power. However, without large scale it is difficult to see how firms could have
borne the fixed costs of investing in the machinery and organisational change
underpinning the high volume methods needed to achieve high productivity.
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German firms were largely in transport and communications (including the
railways and shipping), the share of employment in this sector accounted
for by large firms was extremely high. Germany’s other large service sector
employers in  were two banks. Although no banks appeared in the list
of large British employers before the amalgamations at the end of World War
I, two large insurers did (Wardley , Jeremy ). Six large retailers also
appeared in the list of Britain’s largest employers. So although large firm
employment as a share of all employment was actually larger in Germany
than in Britain in services as well as in industry, this was entirely due to the
transport and communications sector. The rest of the service economy in
Germany was populated by small firms.
. German services since World War II in comparative
perspective
.. Retreat from agriculture
Returning to the data in Table , as much as .per cent of the West German
labour force was still employed in agriculture in , compared with just
.per cent in Britain. By , the German and British shares were . and
.per cent, respectively. This shift out of agriculture played an important
role in the German ‘economic miracle’ of the post-World War II period, as
has been widely noted in the literature (Kindleberger , Dumke ,
Temin ). Less widely noted, however, is the fact that this was primarily a
shift of labour from agriculture into services rather than industry. Compared
with other countries, Germany already had an unusually large share of both
employment and GDP in manufacturing before World War II, so further
expansion in this direction would have been surprising, particularly given
the limited scope for importing many services. Although some labour went
into industry during the s and s, industry’s share of employment
declined from the s, and was smaller in  than in . It is also
worth noting from Table  that although Germany pulled substantially ahead
of Britain in terms of industrial labour productivity between the s and
, subsequent developments have more or less closed that gap. It is in
services that the most substantial and persistent German productivity lead
has emerged.
Conventional estimates of the contribution of the release of labour from
agriculture use shift-share analysis. Broadberry (c, p. ) points out
that structural change accounted for .per cent of the .per cent annual
growth rate of aggregate labour productivity in Germany between  and
, while over the same period structural change contributed nothing
to the .per cent aggregate labour productivity growth in Britain. This
means that structural change accounted for .per cent of the .per cent
aggregate German labour productivity growth advantage over Britain.
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Furthermore, as Broadberry (, pp. –) points out, this is almost
certainly an underestimate of the contribution of the release of labour from
agriculture, since much of the rapid labour productivity growth in German
agriculture (which is counted as inter-sectoral growth in the standard shift-
share analysis) should be regarded as the result of the redeployment of
surplus rural labour. Temin’s () regression-based approach attributes a
central role to the initial share of the labour force in agriculture in explaining
differential productivity growth performance among European countries
during the post-World War II period.
This substantial shift of labour out of agriculture took place despite the
continued protection of agriculture in West Germany and other European
countries. However, given developments in agricultural productivity in
the rest of the world and dramatic reductions in relative transport costs,
feasible levels of agricultural protection were no longer sufficient to support
reasonable incomes in European agriculture without a substantial increase
in agricultural labour productivity. The resulting exodus of labour from
German agriculture led to a substantial expansion of the service sector.
.. Physical and human capital in services
The shift of labour from agriculture to services provided a boost to aggregate
labour productivity in Germany. This was not simply a static reallocation
effect arising from the shift between sectors with different levels of value
added per worker, but arose also through the accumulation of physical and
human capital in services. It must be emphasised that there are severe data
problems in comparing both physical and human capital across countries,
even at the aggregate level, let alone at the sectoral level (O’Mahony ).
Nevertheless, it is possible to demonstrate that the labour transferred from
agriculture to services in Germany after World War II, compared to Britain,
benefited from () higher flows of investment per head in physical capital,
leading to higher stocks of physical capital per head by , and () higher
flows of investment per head in human capital, building on an existing
advantage of higher stocks of human capital per head at the intermediate
level, and making good a shortfall of human capital per head at the higher
level.
Data problems in comparing capital intensity across countries in services
are very severe, and the data on comparative Germany/UK capital per hour
worked in Table  are available only since . O’Mahony’s () data
refer to net capital stocks and have been calculated from sectoral investment
data using the perpetual inventory method and assuming common asset
lives and depreciation rates in both countries. They suggest a higher level
of capital intensity in Germany for the market economy as a whole already
by , and higher levels of capital intensity in Germany in transport and
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Table . Comparative Germany/UK capital per hour worked in market
services, – (UK = ).
Transport & Financial & Total market
communications Distribution business services economy
    
    
    
    
Source: O’Mahony (, pp. , ).
communications and distribution. Only in financial and business services
was capital intensity higher in Britain in , and even here Germany had
higher capital intensity by . O’Mahony’s () data show a rapidly
rising German capital intensity advantage from the s, particularly on a
per hour worked basis. There is a sense in which this flatters the German
service sector, since the number of hours worked per person has fallen more
rapidly in Germany than in Britain, leading to both higher capital per hour
and output per hour. However, the capital intensity and labour productivity
advantage also exists on a per worker basis.
The greater success of Germany than Britain in accumulating physical
capital after World War II can be attributed to the nature of the postwar
settlement in the two countries (Bean and Crafts , Eichengreen ).
The idea of the postwar settlement was to stimulate investment through a
commitment mechanism: unions are prepared to moderate wage claims so
long as firms invest, and firms are prepared to invest so long as unions are
prepared to moderate wage claims. Whilst this appears to have worked
well in economies such as Germany, with sufficiently centralised unions
and employers’ organisations, it faced severe difficulties in a country like
Britain, with decentralised industrial relations (Crouch , Bean and
Crafts ). Although industry was most directly affected by these postwar
settlements, parts of the service sector were also highly unionised, and
the wage moderation effects also filtered through to services through wage
relativities. Hence Eichengreen () formulated the model at the whole
economy level.
The labour that was moving into services, then, was working with more
rapidly increasing levels of capital intensity in Germany. Just as importantly,
however, Germany’s expanding service sector labour force was becoming
increasingly well trained. It is helpful to distinguish between intermediate
and higher levels of training. Intermediate level training covers craft and
technician qualifications above secondary level but below degree level,
 The German capital intensity advantage was even larger in non-market services.
 The original formulation of the problem was by Lancaster ().
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Table . Apprentices as a percentage of persons engaged in Great
Britain and Germany, –.
Great Britain Germany
Services Total Services Total
 . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . .
Sources: Britain: : More (, pp. –), based on data from Board of Trade (),
Report of an Enquiry by the Board of Trade into the Earnings and Hours of Labour of Workpeople
of the United Kingdom, supplemented with information from Board of Trade () Report
of an Enquiry by the Board of Trade into the Conditions of Apprenticeship and Industrial
Training in Various Trades and Occupations of the United Kingdom; : derived from
Ministry of Labour () Report of an Enquiry into Apprenticeship and Training for the Skilled
Occupations in Great Britain and Northern Ireland, –; –: Office of Population
Census and Surveys, Census of England and Wales, Census of Great Britain, Census of Scotland.
Germany: Apprentices: : Statistisches Reichsamt (), Berufs- und
Gewerbeza¨hlung vom . Juni . Gewerbestatistik fu¨r das Reich im Ganzen, Statistik des
Deutschen Reichs, Neue Folge, Band ; : Statistisches Reichsamt (), Berufs- und
Gewerbeza¨hlung vom . Juni . Berufsstatistik, Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Band ;
: Statistisches Reichsamt (), Volks-, Berufs- und Betriebsza¨hlung vom . Juni
, Gewerbliche Betriebsza¨hlung. Die gewerblichen Betriebe und Unternehmungen im
Deutschen Reich, Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Band ; : Statistisches Reichsamt
(), Volks-, Berufs- und Betriebsza¨hlung vom . Das Personal der gewerblichen
Niederlassungen nach der Stellung im Betrieb und die Verwendung von Kraftmaschinen,
Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Band ; : Statistisches Bundesamt (), ‘Die
Lehrlinge und Anlernlinge  bis /’, Beilage zum Heft / der Arbeits- und
sozialstatistischen Mitteilungen; , : Statistisches Bundesamt (), ‘Auszubildende
in Lehr- und Anlernberufen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, Beilage zum Heft /
der Arbeits- und sozialstatistischen Mitteilungen; , : Statistisches Bundesamt (various
years), Statistisches Jahrbuch fu¨r die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Wiesbaden, ,
Table .); Employment: Hoffmann (), Tables , , ; Kohler (), Table .;
Statistisches Bundesamt (various years), Statistisches Jahrbuch fu¨r die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland.
including non-examined time-served apprenticeships, while higher level
training covers qualifications at the standard of a university degree including
membership of professional institutions (Prais , p. ). Germany has
invested relatively heavily in intermediate level qualifications in services
since World War II. This can be seen in Table , where it is clear that
apprenticeship was originally much stronger in industry than in services, in
both Britain and Germany. In Germany, however, apprenticeship spread
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strongly into services after World War II. Although there was a similar
development in Britain during the s, it occurred at a much lower
level than in Germany, where vocational training has been accorded a very
high priority (Prais ). The way in which more highly qualified labour
translated into higher labour productivity in Germany has been examined
in detail in a number of studies of particular sectors. In services, Prais et al.
() studied the hotel sector in Britain and Germany, while more recent
work by Mason et al. () has examined banking.
Again, the difference between the two countries can be seen as an outcome
of the postwar settlement, with Germany providing a more centralised
solution to the externalities posed by the possibility of free riders poaching
trained workers (Carlin , Soskice ). By /, when data on
the stock of qualified labour in both countries first became available, the
proportion of the labour force with at least intermediate level qualifications
was .per cent in Germany compared with just .per cent in Britain
(O’Mahony , p. ). The difference was almost entirely due to
intermediate level qualifications, since the proportion of the labour force
with higher level qualifications was .per cent in Germany and .per cent
in Britain.
Britain had traditionally enjoyed an advantage over Germany in terms of
higher level qualifications in services as a result of the early development
in Britain of professional associations, one function of which was to
oversee the provision of training (Carr-Saunders and Wilson , Reader
). However, this advantage was eroded over time with the spread of
higher education as an alternative provider of higher level qualifications.
Nevertheless, O’Mahony’s () data still suggest a substantial British
advantage in the proportion of the labour force with higher level
qualifications in financial and business services in /, with .per cent
in Britain compared with .per cent in Germany.
.. Modern office technology
German services were generally even slower than British services to adopt
the American high-volume, low-margin approach. Hence we should expect
to see a similar lag in the adoption of modern office technology in Germany.
Table  presents some flow data on sales of office machinery in Britain,
the United States and Germany from the early s to the late s.
The starting date reflects the fact that office machinery was not recorded
separately in British trade statistics before , while the end date reflects
the growing importance of the electronic computer.
For typewriters, there is evidence of a rapid German investment drive
during the s, although this fell off again during the s, suggesting a
postwar reconstruction effect. For cash registers, calculating machines and
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Table . Office machine sales per  population, –.
A. Typewriters (units)
      
UK . . . . . . .
US . . . . . . .
Germany . . .
B. Cash registers, calculating machines and other office machinery.
(£ at constant  prices)
    
UK . . . . .
US . . . . ,.
Germany . . . ,.
Notes: Sales obtained as production minus exports plus imports. US and German values
converted to sterling at unit value price ratios for manufacturing; current prices in sterling
converted to constant prices using the UK deflator for GDP at factor cost. Dates for US:
, , , , , , ; Dates for Germany: , , , .
Sources: Production: US: Department of Commerce (various years), Census of Manufactures;
UK: Board of Trade (various years), Census of Production; Germany: Statistisches Reichsamt
(), Die deutsche Industrie; Statistisches Bundesamt (various years), Die Industrie der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland; Exports and imports: US: Department of Commerce (various
years), Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States; UK: Board of Trade (various
years), Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom; Germany: Statistisches
Reichsamt (various years), Monatliche Nachweise u¨ber den auswa¨rtiges Handel Deutschlands;
Statistisches Bundesamt (various years), Der Aussenhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland;
Population: US: Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States; UK:
Feinstein (); CSO, Annual Abstract of Statistics; Germany: Statistisches Reichsamt,
Statistisches Jahrbuch fu¨r das Deutsche Reich; Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch
fu¨r die Bundesrepublik Deutschland; Manufacturing unit value price ratios: Broadberry
(a); Deflator for GDP at factor cost, UK: Feinstein (); CSO, Economic Trends
Annual Supplement.
other office machinery, there is no evidence of a systematic German lead
over Britain before the late s, and both countries clearly lagged behind
the United States.
.. International trade in services
Finally, it is worth noting that the large advantage that Britain once reaped
from a much larger tradable services sector was already much diminished
by the s, when systematic data become available. In part A of Table ,
we see that during the first half of the s Germany overtook Britain
in terms of the share of total OECD service sector credits, and retained a
slightly larger share throughout the rest of the s and the s. However,
since Germany retained a much larger share of total OECD service sector
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Table . International trade in services.
UK Germany USA
A. Credits as a percentage of OECD total
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
B. Debits as a percentage of OECD total
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
C. Ratio of credits to debits
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
Source: Derived from OECD, Services: Statistics on International Transactions.
debits, shown here in part B of Table , Germany remained a substantial
net importer of services, while Britain continued to be a major net exporter
of services. Hence the ratio of credits to debits in part C of Table  is
persistently above unity for Britain and below unity for Germany.
. Conclusions
Germany overtook Britain in comparative productivity levels for the whole
economy primarily as a result of trends in services rather than trends
in industry. Although German economic success has conventionally been
attributed to manufacturing, it is important to distinguish between levels and
growth rates of productivity. Germany had already caught up with Britain
in manufacturing by the late nineteenth century, but lagged considerably in
services. This meant that there was much less scope for subsequent rapid
productivity growth in Germany’s already productive industry than in the
relatively underdeveloped service sector.
Britain’s productivity lead in services before World War II can be seen
as reflecting external economies of scale in a highly urbanised economy
with an international orientation, while low productivity in the bulk of the
German service sector reflected the underdevelopment of services in an
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economy that was slow to move out of agriculture. There are, however,
two important exceptions to this characterisation of German services, which
have both received a great deal of attention in the literature, and hence
given a misleading impression. These are the railways and the universal
banks, both of which can be understood within Germany’s state-driven
policy of modernisation based on heavy industry. High productivity on the
railways gave a substantial boost to productivity in the German transport and
communications sector, particularly before World War I. The impact of the
universal banks on productivity is less visible, however, since they were but
one part of the wider financial services sector. It must be emphasised that the
railways and the universal banks were highly unrepresentative of the German
service sector before World War II, and that the more typical German service
sector provider was small-scale, less specialised than in Britain, and achieving
a much lower level of productivity.
As German agricultural employment contracted sharply from the s,
catching-up occurred in services. This was aided by a sharp increase in
human and physical capital accumulation, underpinned by the institutional
framework of the postwar settlement and a greater participation in the
international service economy. It was important that Germany’s vocational
training system, so widely appreciated for its contribution to manufacturing,
spread also into services. And although Germany continued to run a deficit
on service sector trade, by the s Germany’s contribution to service sector
exports was on a par with Britain’s.
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